Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Culture Corner: The Politics of Prachett, Part 1 (Guards, Guards!)

In my earlier post about the politics of fantasy, I talked about how I've found it difficult to enjoy works of fantasy that aren't critical of, subversive of, or consciously playing with the dominant tropes of the genre, and how I've found some accommodation in fantasy books that play with and deconstruct the politics of fantasy.

One of the best of these is the Discworld series of Terry Pratchett, both in terms of the thematic and aesthetic riches that Pratchett is able to pull out from his playing with the tropes of fantasy, but also the extent and depth of political thinking that's being done in these novels.

So, as a regular part of the Culture Corner, I'm going to be examining the politics of Discworld and there's no better place to start than with the eighth book in the series, Guards Guards, which I will argue contains a strong element of humanist polemic against the elitist themes embedded in sword-and-sorcery fiction.


Guards Guards makes a good starting point in part because Terry Pratchett very deliberately sets the book up as an attempt to make people think about the "mooks" of heroic fiction as real people, as a lens into making them think about the morality, ethics, and politics of heroism. You get this straight from the start with the dedication:

They may be called the Palace Guard, the City Guard, or the Patrol. Whatever the name, their purpose in any work of heroic fantasy is identical: it is, round about Chapter Three (or ten minutes into the film) to rush into the room, attack the hero one at a time, and be slaughtered. No-one ever asks them if they wanted to. This book is dedicated to those fine men.

This quote should immediately set off a troubling thought to the fantasy fan: what, exactly, is the difference between the hero who slaughters his way through a room of helpless mooks and a villain who slaughters his way through a room of helpless Redshirts? When we're talking about a clash between the Strong and the Weak, when the outcome is absolutely certain, heroic combat beings to look a bit like wanton murder.

On to Guards, Guards. To quickly summarize the plot for those who haven't read it: Anhk-Morpork, the greatest and grubbiest of cities on the Disc, is going about its business when a book is stolen, a dragon appears and begins to burn down parts of the city, the city advertizes for a hero, a hero emerges claiming to be the rightful king and slays the dragon, and is carried off by the adoring crowds to the palace where the tyrant is overthrown and thrown into his own dungeons, and the coronation for the new king is planned. That's when it goes all wrong - the dragon comes back, torches the king, is given the crown, becomes the Dragon King of Anhk-Morpork, the terrified people welcome their new ruler and offer up a human sacrifice, the day is saved when a "whittle" of a lizard and the grubby members of the city police force arrest the dragon, and the tyrant resumes his rightful position as ruler of the city.

Because what the book is really about is Heroism, Monarchy, Chivalry, Romance, and why these things are in fact really, really dangerous ideas that most people would, in reality, find totally abhorrent.

We first run headlong into these themes when we encounter the Elucidated Brethren of the Ebon Night. This secret society is a multi-layered parody: it's both a parody of the Secret Society as it appears in fiction, the thinking of people who join secret society, and I'm going to argue, the thinking of fantasy fans. On the first point, there's the fact that while the "Unique and Supreme" Lodge sees itself as the ancient heirs to mystic secrets, they are in fact so unimaginative a secret society that their passwords and rituals overlap with other secret societies whose identical premises three doors down are constantly getting confused with. On the second point, while the members of the Ebon Night would like to believe that they are selfless seekers after ancient truths (learning "mystic prunes," how to walk on rice paper, etc.), they are in fact a bunch of credulous, mean-spirited people who joined the society in order to feel a false sense of superiority and paper over their massive insecurity complexes and resentment. In a harsh light, there's a resemblance between Brethren and fantasy fans who use escapist fiction as a source of revenge fantasies (there's a reason why the more violent fantasy works tend to draw large readership, and the similarity between the "Bad Guys" and real world figures of authority and social status) and escapism (there's also a reason why fantasy protagonists are social outcasts who are secretly possessed of Special Qualities, and/or physically and mentally perfect Superheroes to identify with).

What makes this kind of thinking dangerous, Pratchett is arguing, is that it blinds us to the difference between Myth and Reality, causes an unthinking valorization of the Past as better than the Present, and makes you vulnerable to people like the Supreme Grand Master. The Supreme Grand Master of the Ebon Night is the one who makes these losers dangerous, because he links their humdrum grudges to the reality of exercising unlimited power,and because his basic cynicism allows him to manipulate their belief in Destiny, True Heroes, and the Greatness of Kings (notice the way in which the Supreme Grand Master ties the discourse on myths, prophecy, the romantic Middle Ages with Chivalry and virtuous kings with his internal monologue on secret knowledge as willing ignorance and lies). The Supreme Grand Master doesn't believe that Magic has Morality, who is both willing and able to stage scenes of false heroism that's indistinguishable from the real thing, who knows that the Rightful King is the one left holding the crown, and his own vision of a Utopian Golden Age is a world in which he rules absolutely in the King's name, where People Know Their Place and where only the Right People Are In Charge. In this sense, the Grand Master represents all that's worst about both Idealism and Elitism - he's willing to murder on a grand scale to reshape the world to fit his personal vision, and his personal vision is a world of privilege and inequality.

Enter Carrot. While on one level, Carrot's supposed to represent the real thing - he's the secret heir to the throne, he's the one with the real sword and the bookmark and the prophecy, and he's actually good and noble and true, and he's the one who charges into danger to "serve and protect" - he's also deeply problematic. There's a reason why Pratchett compares him to an "iceberg drifting into a major shipping lane." Carrot is physically perfect - muscles on top of muscles - and charismatic, and therefore he can impose his will on others. But he's also "simple;" he doesn't understand the difference between what should be an what is, the difference between the law and reality, and the need to adapt institutions to human nature, instead of vice versa. In fact, his origins as an adopted dwarf can be seen as subtext - the hero isn't really a human, doesn't understand the basic frailty and shortcomings that make people human, and he doesn't fit into society. When Carrot first arrives in the city, he brainwashes an entire tavern of dwarfs because they're not living up to his ideal of what Dwarfs Should Act Like, beats the living crap out of everyone inside the Mended Drum because they are breaking laws that haven't been enforced in hundreds of years (which is rather unfair when you think about it), arrests the head of the Thieves' Guild in contravention of the guild's Charter, and so forth.

It's not until Carrot joins the Watch, and is brought face to face with three real and frail human beings, that he begins to change. The conversation between Carrot, Colon, and Nobby about "Leggy" Gaskin's death is an important turning point - where the young man begins to learn the difference between "what is" and "what ought to be," and what it means to ask a middle-aged obese man and a tiny weakling to go up against a dragon for thirty dollars a month. "All for one and one for all" only really works when you're dealing with two-dimensional Three Musketeers, yet the true nobility of Colon and Nobby comes through when they stand in the face of the dragon, not once, but three times (the first time when the Watch House is destroyed, the second up on the top of Small Gods, and the third on top of Bearhugger's Distillery). After this conversation, Carrot begins to shift to a different kind of character, a good man who learns how to be good in an imperfect world - he acts simple when he's not, he learns to change the world through persuasion and gradual reform rather than acts of sudden violence, and he renounces the idea that a King should make things better by appealing to the emotions, to Romance is wrong. More on this in a later post, as we'll see how an anti-monarchist royal becomes the true essence of the Good King in Men At Arms.

Pratchett is redefining heroism as ordinary people acting in spite of their ordinariness, and implicitly notes that the heroism of Conan-esque musclemen without a speck of fear (the same kind of heroic thugs who refuse to fight the dragon because the pay's too low, the same kind of good-looking protagonists like the King who put an attractive gloss on oppressive governments) is wrong, that it's rooted in a belief that some kind of people are better than other, and that physical force is legitimated by the moral character of superior individuals. After all Beowulf is good because the narrator tells us he is, but what does the situation looks like when Grendel's mother comes to complain? When it turns out that monsters are sentient beings? The dodge employed ever since Tolkien that certain races of humanoids are Always Chaotic Evil begins to look problematic in the face of its historical racism. All of the sudden, our simple enjoyment of fictional violence gets all complicated.

Sam Vimes, however, becomes Guards, Guards' protagonist in a way that Carrot couldn't be. In a certain way, because Sam Vimes' point of view is the foundation for the film noir elements that Pratchett uses to undercut and complicate heroic fantasy, he's absolutely essential, the Raymond Chandleresque noir hero. But what makes Vimes really interesting is that his heroism is essentially about ideology and belief. Captain Sam Vimes of the Night Watch, in a book about the allure of Monarchy, is the city's lone republican, a man who believes that people should be independent and equal, that the law should protect even the criminals of the Shades, and that power should be constrained by truth. Thus, Sam Vimes refuses to cover up murders, continues to hunt the Dragon despite the lethal danger, refuses to give up when he's fired by Wonse and later imprisoned. But unlike other idealists, Vimes is a pragmatist, a realist - he knows that people can be cowards, idiots, and so on; his beliefs are filtered through experience, so that they emerge from the world instead of being imposed on the world. He's also the foil to Vetinari, a man, who in his own way, like Carrot insists that people can be good. We'll find out more about his republicanism in later segments of the Politics of Pratchett.

Havelock Vetinari, the Patrician of Ankh-Morpork could be described as what a tyrant would look like in real life, if you removed the constraints of the genre that tend to make the Bad Guy stupid as well as evil. After all, he more or less admits that the reason why he's so good as a ruler of Ankh-Morpork is that "We're the only ones who know how to make things work...Because the bad people know how to plan. It's part of the specification, you might say. Every evil tyrant has a plan to rule the world. The good people don't seem to have the knack.'" (Guards Guards) However, I'm going to argue something completely different. Vetinari is, in fact, not a sympathetic villain - he's a Machiavellian Republican.

Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli is among the most misunderstood political philosophers in the Western tradition, and unfortunately remembered as an amoral advocate of real-politik on on the basis of Il Principe (The Prince). What people sometimes forget is that Machiavelli was in life a staunch republican, who served as a diplomat to the courts of France, Spain and the Papecy from the Florentine Republic, and who, as commander of the Florentine militia, led Florence to victory against Pisa and in defeat against the Spanish/Papal/Medici alliance at Prato. Because he was a leading republican, the vengeful Medici had him put to the strappado (a form of torture where the subjects hands are tied behind their back and then lifted into the air on ropes attached to the wrists, causing intense pain and dislocation of the arms) to get him to name himself as a conspirator against the Medici and to name names of his fellow conspirators. Machiavelli refused. They strappado'd him nine times. He never said a word. This was not a man to be trifled with.

In his philosophy, Machiavelli was a republican who nonetheless did not idealize the common man (as did many later republican philosophers, especially those of the French Revolution). I would argue that he simultaneously believed that "For of men it may generally be affirmed, that they are thankless, fickle, false studious to avoid danger, greedy of gain," and that "a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a Prince: And not without reason is the voice of the people like that of God." Human beings, in Machiavelli's view, were as good or bad as their environments and their social institutions allowed them to be - a well-ordered republic would make men behave better by restraining their negative impulses and encouraging their positive impulses, but in a monarchy, there is no constraint to the negative impulses of the king.

Compare this to Vetinari's discourse on human nature:
'I believe you find life such a problem because you think there are the good people and the bad people,' said the man. 'You're wrong, of course. There are, always and only, the bad people, but some of them are on opposite sides.'

He waved his thin hand towards the city and walked over to the window.

'A great rolling sea of evil,' he said, almost proprietorially. 'Shallower in some places, of course, but deeper, oh, so much deeper in others. But people like you put together little rafts of rules and vaguely good intentions and say, this is the opposite, this will triumph in the end. Amazing!' He slapped Vimes good-naturedly on the back.

'Down there,' he said, 'are people who will follow any dragon, worship any god, ignore any iniquity. All out of a kind of humdrum, everyday badness. Not the really high, creative loathsomeness of the great sinners, but a sort of mass-produced darkness of the soul. Sin, you might say, without a trace of originality. They accept evil not because they say yes, but because they don't say no. I'm sorry if this offends you,' he added, patting the captain's shoulder, 'but you fellows really need us.' (Guards Guards)
This is Machiavellian Republicanism, aware of humanity's capacity for evil, but working always to build institutions that can reform it. And when we look aat how Vetinari operates, we see this philosophy in action. For while Ankh-Morpork may be on the surface a tyranny, ruled by an absolute ruler (the Man with the Vote), it's actually a syndicalist republic.

In Ankh-Morpork, most industries and professions are organized into guilds - not just the traditional guilded occupations of the Middle Ages like the Butchers, the Bakers, the Smiths, the Merchants, and so forth, but also the Beggars, the Seamstresses (prostitutes), the Assassins and the Thieves. All guilds operate under a civic charter, and guild charters have the force of law - such that, for much of the city, there is no free market as we would understand it, but the regulations and bylaws of unionized workers who own their skills, and in the case of Journeymen and Masters, the means of production as well. These guilds form the Guild Council, which serves as the city's legislative body, and which elects the Patrician - who is the executive branch of what is in the end a republic, even if one with a very powerful executive branch. For while the Patrician theoretically has the power to issue laws by decree, to operate beyond the boundaries of the normal criminal justice system, it's also the case that the Patrician can be removed by vote of the guilds, and prosecuted for violation of the law. More on this in later segments.

And Vetinari approves of this constitutional arrangement. Indeed, what we learn of Vetinari's public policy regarding the guilds is that he believes in extending the system of syndicalist guilds throughout the socio-economic order, as a Machiavellian-Republican means of creating institutions that guide human behavior. One of his first acts as Patrician was to legalize the previously extra-legal Thieves Guild, to make crime legal and organized, subjecting it to the bureaucratic process of yearly budgets and forward-planning, and rigorous maintenance of the closed shop. He then informs the somewhat incredulous masters of the Thieves Guild (who at this point think they've just made it for life) that he, Vetinari the graduate with full honors of the Assassins' Guild School, now knows where they and their families live, and that he will enforce the budgets that they've agreed to with any means necessary. We also learn later that another one of Vetinari's intial acts as Patrician was to legalize the Seamstresses' Guild - so that some of the most vulnerable workers in the city have the protection of self-organization.

And why does Vetinari do all this? Why struggle all the way to the top, having to fight off assassination attempts and engage in some of his own? Because Vetinari, like Machiavelli is a patriotic republican: "While he, Patrician of Ankh-Morpork, ruled the city, preserved the city, loved the city, hated the city and had spent a lifetime in the service of the city." And as we'll see in future installments, Vetinari is one of the heroes of the story.

[+/-] Read More...

Saturday, April 18, 2009

Re-Post Number 6: "Public Employment and Economic Planning: History, Theory, Implications" (September 19, 2007)

Note:
You'll note some similarities between this diary and the more recent diary on economic planning and the Apollo Alliance. Luckily, the older diary goes into what future economic planning should look like, providing enough new material to be of interest.
-------------------------------------------------------

History

Economic planning is probably the most obfuscated public policy in American history, bar none. The cries of socialized medicine, the Harry and Louise ads, the current struggles over SCHIP - all of these pale in comparison to the sound and fury raised over economic planning. Conservative Republicans and Democrats called it creeping socialism, Hayek called it creeping fascism, and the public imagination reeled before an onslaught of images of totalitarian control.

The reality was much less terrifying. The NRPB, the National Resources Planning Board, was probably the most influential of the New Deal planning institutions. Ostensibly an institution for rationalizing use of things like coal, oil, timber, etc., the NRPB instead became a place for people to re-think economic planning as an exercise in democracy, as a way of directing the guiding the economy towards goals that enhanced the quality of life for all citizens, as a way of putting the people in charge of their economic life.

Throughout the 1940's, the NRPB published a series of reports, laying out the blueprint for a new kind of American society that would come after the war, a society based on the principles of the Four Freedoms and the Second Bill of Rights proposed by President Roosevelt.

Now how does all of this tie in with public employment? In their reports, the staffers of the NRPB looked to programs like the Works Progress Administration as an example of how the government could provide services en masse to Americans in need. More importantly, the NRPB's reports, especially the 1942 Report titled "Security, Work, and Relief Policies," envisioned the provision of jobs by the Federal government as a permanent policy designed to push the country towards full employment, in conjunction with Keynesian economic policies.

The importance of this shift in economic planning, from the crude efforts to secure price and wage cooperation under the National Recovery Administration to a more sophisticated understanding of the possibilities of public action, was that it expanded the policy imagination of New Deal Democrats far beyond the narrow scope we see today. Moreover, New Deal Democrats had reason to believe that such actions were possible. The WPA had shown that the Federal government could fund and administer mass employment projects and that such projects had a substantial impact on the unemployment rare. The Office of Price Administration, a war-time agency that was given the power to regulate prices and wages, succeeded in holding inflation below 1% in a period of full employment.

Because of these advances, the NRPB believed that the national government could provide the trifecta of broad prosperity: low unemployment, low inflation, high economic growth. In essence, everything that the so-called "golden age" of the 1950-1960's was supposed to have achieved. However, there were two key differences between the golden age as envisioned by the economic planners and the golden age that transpired: first, public employment, price and wage controls, and more expansive social insurance programs would have ensured that prosperity would have flowed from public actions, such that the political will of the people, not the largess of corporate America, would have promoted economic growth. Second, it would have meant that the benefits of post-war growth would have been much more broadly distributed, both to the poor, and to minorities.

The end result, however, was that of political defeat - the de-funding of the NRPB, the watering-down of the Full Employment Act (as discussed in my previous diary), and the demonizing of both public employment and economic planning.

Theory

So what should this tell us about economic planning and public employment?

First, it should remind us that the belief that the government's actions do not influence the economy is historically inaccurate - public action can and has dramatically shaped the economy, altering employment levels and inflation rates for periods of several years at a time. Thus, our understanding of what is and is not possible in terms of economic policy should be expanded beyond the boundaries of the orthodox.

Second, it should make us think about the purposes behind economic policy. It is often a habit of Democrats to focus on particular economic indicators - economic growth, numbers of jobs created, and so forth - instead of picturing a vision of the kind of economy and society that we seek to achieve and then moving towards it.

Third, we must realize that victory begets victories and defeat, defeats - we cannot allow any push we make in the future to be stymied by Republican obstructionism. Just as the defeat of health care in 1994 robbed the Democrats of a major policy victory that would rally the base AND working class voters, so too will defeats on public employment, or any other initiative. More on this topic in my next diary.

In terms of economic planning, we need to shift our theoretical perspective to the global and the long-term. The United States stands at an uncertain point - we are still the world's largest economy, but long term trends in terms of debts, deficits, and balance of trade shows how vulnerable our position is. The American people stand at an even more perilous position - the poor, the working class, and the middle class are all facing stagnating and/or declining fortunes in terms of income, wealth, homeownership, health coverage, and no doubt higher education will be soon to follow.

What then should economic planning aim at?

1. Restore Income to Restore Savings/Balance of Trade/Rough Equality

The American economy has been shored up in recent years by the endless cycle of consumer debt that masks the decline in real incomes. Boosting the purchasing power of the ordinary American would help to restore our internal market- an essential goal, given the variability of the globalized economy. Moreover, it would put our consumer base on a much stronger basis regarding income v. debt, allowing savings, assets accumulation, and investment to increase, and redirecting more income towards the broader economy and away from finance payments, which fuel an over-saturated financial sector.

2. Use Public Employment to Shield Against Globalization

If the reality of living in a globalized economy is that industries shift rapidly across borders, then it becomes essential for the U.S and other developed economies that are likely to lose industries to less developed region to increase, not decrease their social spending. Increasing public employment can keep unemployment rates low, preventing economic decay in areas that are losing jobs, maintaining consumption levels through fueling wages. Moreover, public employment provides a shield against the destabilizing effects of globalization, a safe haven against sudden ups and downs in world markets, by counter-cyclical actions.

3. Use Public Investment to Guide the Economy Forward

Public investment can act in a complementary fashion, to create new industries that take the place of old industries, to improve the national infrastructure upon which industries depend - not just roads, bridges, and levees, but also schools, wireless internet, and research and development into new technologies. This both creates new goods and services, adding to economic growth, but also provides jobs that are designed to be more "grounded" in the American economy than consumer-goods production.

4. Set A Comprehensive Target for Economic Policy

Although we don't admit it, and we don't approach it in as much of a conscious fashion as we need to, there are certain targets that government policy does aim at - inflation at less than 2% a year, economic growth of at least 3% a year have been fairly standard aims. However, they are not targets that particularly benefit ordinary Americans - they don't include wage growth, they don't include unemployment, and they don't include the distribution of wealth in American society.

So when we engage in economic planning, it should be to hit targets that represent the whole of the American economy and the whole of the American people as well.

Implications

I'm sure that many of you are familiar with the Apollo Initiative, a joint project of labor unions and environmental groups to achieve energy independence on a basis of green technology and green jobs.
http://www.apolloalliance.org/...

Now, on it's own, the Apollo Initiative is an impressive policy innovation, envisioning a 10-year, $300 billion push towards alternative energy that envisions a whole host of coordinated policies, subsidies, and tax reforms towards a single end. It's certainly much more innovative than anything we've seen in the last few years.

However, as a model for future policy, it suggests an intriguing possibility for American policy and economic planning. Here we have a model of coordinating economic and social objectives that aims to "do good and do well" at the same time, a way of economic planning without falling into the public relations traps.

Imagine, if you will, a host of Initiatives, all designed to boost economic performance, develop new industries, create jobs, improve the national infrastructure, and benefit the commonweal of the country:

  • Athena Initiative - centered around education (building new schools, recruiting teachers by providing salary bonuses, developing new educational technologies, expanding access to higher education through expanding campuses of both public and private universities - think about it, Harvard rejects all but 7% of applicants, turning away thousands and thousands of superlative students - why not expand the undergraduate body beyond just 6-odd thousand?)
  • Mercury Initiative - centered around telecommunications and information technology (providing free broadband internet, universally compatible cellular phone networks, expanding opportunities for startups in the music and movie business, and so forth).
  • Asclepius Initiative - centered around health care industry (leveraging our current public investments in medicine such as the VA, NIH, etc. into creative new publically-owned generic drugs, providing incentives for healthier work environments, improving our public health systems, using health research to uncover "best methods" of health care, so that more money is put towards care instead of overcare, and so forth).

In this way, the federal government would essentially become the national venture capitalist, using its ability to sustain investments across decades before technologies prove themselves.


[+/-] Read More...

Friday, April 17, 2009

Policy Round-Up: the Apollo Initiative as Democratic Planning

Policy wonks and other people who follow public policy issues are probably familiar with the Apollo Alliance, a blue-green alliance of environmentalists and labor unions that's become a stock part of the Democratic Party's platform on environmental and economic policy. Back in 2004, Kerry signed onto it; Obama basically did the same.

For those of you who aren't familiar with it, the basic idea is to fuse environmental policy - alternative energy, "green tech," energy-efficient building, mass transit - with labor and economic policy - creating new jobs that are well-paid, have good benefits, and are union-friendly, as a way to create new domestic industry and manufacturing. The Apollo Initiative, which they were promoting back in 2004, envisioned $30 billion a year for ten years as a public investment into " promoting new technology, improving manufacturing processes, and expanding markets [of "green tech"]...improving the performance of our existing energy system... construction of high performance, energy efficient buildings...[new sources of] renewable energy...new transit system starts, maintenance of the nation’s passenger train system, development of regional high speed rail networks, and improvements in the nation’s roads and highways." Their current Apollo Program calls for a $50 billion a year for ten year investment in energy-efficient buildings, renewable fuels, a new power grid, increasing efficiency of existing power plants, building mass transit, building fuel-efficient cars...the list goes on and on.

In and of itself, it looks like nothing special - basic, Democratic Party boilerplate, the kind of buzzword-driven wonkery that gets tossed around in primaries and never amounts to nothing. I'm going to argue that it's actually a way to recover a missing part of progressive politics and policy that was lost to us during the Cold War.

Ever since the Progressive Era (1880s-1910s), one of the major political and policy divides has been between the advocates of economic planning and the advocates of the free market. To our modern ears, this sounds a little bit ridiculous - planning recalls the Soviet Five Year Plans, the forced industrializations, lousy steel being made to fit Communist Party quotas that couldn't be used, the whole panoply of anti-communist imagery that people who were born after the start of the Cold War have in our heads. But once, there were great thinkers like Thorstein Veblen, Henry Carter Adams, Richard Ely, and John Bates Clark debated whether the free market was an inevitable facet of economic life, or whether rational planning could replace it.

Enter the New Deal. With the free market in total collapse, economic planning entered into the mainstream of American politics and public policy, and the government for the first time in a non-war situation attempted to direct the course o economic activity. Roughly speaking, three kinds of economic planning were attempted during the New Deal:

Tennessee Valley Authority - founded on May 18th, 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was an experiment in regional democratic planning. Supported by activist-bureaucrats like David Lilienthal, and Arthur Morgan, the idea behind the TVA was to attack the economic problems of the Tennessee Valley from multiple directions - producing fertilizers and promoting modern farming techniques to raise production, hiring the unemployed to do conservation work, generating electricity and irrigation through the construction of hydro-electric dams, flood-control, reforestation, the development of industry (especially through the provision of cheap hydro-electic power), and so on. The TVA also recognized labor unions, and less successfully sought to find jobs for unemployed African-Americans and women.

However, the idea behind the TVA went far beyond that. In the vision of Arthur Morgan, the key element of the TVA were local democratic planning boards, in which farmers, aided by experts from the TVA, would decide the future of their areas and work to develop their way out of poverty. In the vision of David Lilienthal, the key element of the TVA was the creation of public power utilities which could restore competition, lower the price of electricity and water, and extend services to the underserved - with the ultimate aim being to challenge the monopolistic private utilities on behalf of consumers. While the two bitterly fought, the ultimate vision, of a public intervention into the economy, the creation of public economic power used on behalf of the poor, of attacking every aspect of regional poverty and underdevelopment was a powerful one.

And in a nation supposedly devoted to the free market, the TVA exists to this day as a massive publically-owned industry, a living legacy of economic planning, and one that is politically beloved by Americans of all stripes of political opinion.

National Recovery Administration - founded on June 16th, 1933, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) was an experiment in tripartite economic planning. Promoted by expert-administrators like Don Richberg, Rexford Tugwell, and Raymond Moley, the basic concept of the NRA was that American industry could recover through an increase in prices, production, employment, and wages if government, business, labor worked together. The normal anti-trust laws would be suspended, and Codes would be set up for each industry, establishing codes of "fair competition," setting prices, wages, and hours, abolishing child labor and recognizing labor unions. The idea would be that by reducing competitive pressure and restoring profitability, production and employment would increase and the economy would recover.

The experiment has widely been seen as an utter disaster - codes were widely ignored, especially in regards to minimum wages, maximum hours, and the recognition of unions, red tape and arbitary regulation were blamed for strangling recovery and extneding the Great Depression. It was declared unconstitutional in 1935, and even many New Dealers saw the program's terminationa as a relief from an embarrasment. Economists especially hate the NRA and point to it as the prime example of why interfering with the free market never, ever works.

Myself, I'm a little bit more skeptical. After all, unemployment dropped from 22.9% in 1932 to 14.4% in 1935 (personally, I think that the New Deal's job programs had more to do with this). Prices went from dropping about 10% the year before, to increasing by an average of 3% in 1934 and 1935. Industrial production, which dropped by 25% in the first six months of the NRA, was up by 22% from its May 1933 levels when the NRA was terminated in 1935. If the NRA was so economically damaging, it didn't seem to prevent a recovery from taking place; perhaps the worst that could be said against it is that it was ineffective but benign.

While I wouldn't bet the farm on it, I think the case against the NRA might be worth re-opening.

National Resources Planning Board - the NRPB was founded in 1933, as a modest agency within the Interior Department, with a mandate to plan public works projects so that the Public Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration could have a "shelf" of "shovel-ready projects" to build in the future. In 1939, however, this little policy shop was transferred into the Executive Office of the President, and was given an expanded brief as the central agency for national economic planning. Under the direction of FDR's uncle, Frederick Delano, and the research expertise of Eveline Burns (a Columbia University economist who had consulted for the Committee on Economic Security that established the system we know today as Social Security, and had worked closely with the WPA), the NRPB was tasked with envisioning the future direction of America, in every aspect of life.

By 1939, the New Deal had begun to adopt the theories of Keynesian economics, and many of the economic planners in the NRPB and other agencies thought that they now had the tools to ensure permanent prosperity and full employment, through government activism in the economy. The NRPB's main contribution to this body of thought were a series of reports laying out plans for economic development, government organization, the use of natural resources, and so on. The most important of these reports was Work, Security, and Relief Policies. In this report, the NRPB outlined a vision for a "cradle to grave" welfare state that would cover all Americans who were unable to work, and the "right to a job" for all Americans who wanted to work. In this manner, the government would ensure full employment, and the full production and rapid economic growth that would follow - and the expanded revenues would pay the cost of the welfare state. It was a total economic vision of a new economic order defined by universal rights and characterized by economic security - a world in which no American would ever have to fear poverty.

In the 1940s, the principles of the NRPB's report were introduced into Congress as the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill (combining the nationalization of unemployment insurance and disability insurance and the expansion of Social Security with a universal health insurance system), and the Full Employment Act (mandating full employment through Keynesian planning and a public employment program as employer of last resort). It was probably the most left-leaning moment in American history. And the result was total defeat - the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill went down to defeat every year between 1945 and the present day (John Dingell introduced the bill every year between 1945 and his retirement, his son John Dingell Jr. has continued this tradition); the Full Employment Act was eviscerated in committee and was passed in a toothless, watered-down version; and the NRPB itself was disassembled by a hostile Congress. Once the Cold War had set in, anything that smacked of state planning was demonized as Communistic, socialistic, and red.

Ok, so what's the relation between the Apollo Alliance and the New Deal's economic planning? Because when I look at the Apollo Alliance, I see something that looks like a cross between the NRPB (national forward planning) and the TVA (focused public investment in particular industrial developments). What animates the Apollo Alliance is a vision of a new kind of economy, one that has lower emissions, uses less carbon, is more energy-efficient and self-sufficient with alternative fuels, that has more of a manufacturing base, and develops towards high-density urban development along mass-transit corridors instead of massive sprawl.

What excites me about them is that what we have here are the first glimmerings of an idea, one not seen in seventy years, that the economic future of this country should ultimately be in the hands of a democratically-elected government, and not the whims of the casino we call the free market. Ultimately, if the Apollo Alliance is about anything, it's the idea that through a direct public investment, we can shift ourself from one economic model to another. While this might sound inconsequential to some, I would argue that the lifework of dozens, if not hundred and thousands of activists throughout the twentieth century, so long denied by the forces of fear and anti-communism, testify otherwise.

If we think of the economy and economic forces as similar to the great oceans and the natural laws that govern the winds and the tides, the hope of democratic planning is that we can build a ship and learn to tack into the wind, to guide ourselves with compass and sextant and marine chronometer, and that human reason, rather than the blind workings of fate, shall determine the course of our lives.

[+/-] Read More...

Monday, April 13, 2009

Re-Post Number 5: " WPA and Keynesianism - Theory and Policy of Public Employment" (August 13, 2007)

Note:

The following post continues in the trend of moving from the technical aspects of public employment policy to the intellectual aspects of public employment policy. Here, I show how public employment policy both fits and doesn't quite fit within the boundaries of Keynesian economic theory.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

In my last diary, I wrote about the differences between public employment and public works, and the implications for current and future policy. Today, I’m going to talk about the relationship between Keynesian economic policy and public employment, and what lessons we can draw from this.

First, a quick definition of terms:

Public Employment – as has already been talked about, public employment is the policy of the government directly hiring people who currently are unemployed for the purposes of reducing unemployment, increasing purchasing power, and secondarily creating public goods and services.

Keynesianism - is a bit more complicated, and as a non-economist, I’m not really that qualified to talk about it (I have read the General Theory and several books about the historical impact of Keynesian theory on public policy, but I haven’t taken any courses on Keynesian economics). But to present just a simplified version of John Maynard Keynes’ theory, and the public policy that resulted from it:



* First, Keynes argued that classical economists had misunderstood key aspects of wages and prices. As he argued, the idea behind Say’s Law – that supply creates its own demand, and that therefore the economy is always at an optimum equilibrium – was not right. The level of production and employment in an economy at any given time was not determined solely by the individual calculations of capitalists regarding their own prices and wages, but was profoundly shaped by aggregate or effective demand. Essentially, Keynes was arguing that you can’t sell stuff without there being enough people with money to buy it.

* Second, Keynes argued that, contrary to the advice of orthodox economists at the time, slashing wages (both to cut costs and to increase willingness to work) was not the answer to the Great Depression. Rather, he argued that cutting wages also cut effective demand for goods (how much people are actually able to buy, versus how much they’d like to buy) – which cut profits, returns on investment, and any expansion of the economy those things would create. Essentially, Keynes was arguing that protecting profits at the expense of workers would make things worse.

* Third, Keynes argued that people are not as economically rational as classical economists would like to believe – that people have psychological reactions to the economy. To begin with, he argued that when wages and prices fall, people hold back from spending their money because they expect them to keep falling. Next, he argued that people have a preference to save more money than they need to – and that in a recession or a depression, people hold onto their money because they’re afraid that if they invest it, they’ll lose it. This leads to insufficient demand and insufficient investment that prevents recovery. Essentially, Keynes was arguing that economies could "stabilize" at levels far below their normal levels of "full" employment and investment – meaning that economies wouldn’t just get better on their own.

* Fourth, Keynes argued that the government was uniquely able to repair this situation, if it acted in an organized fashion. First, by using its power to tax and borrow, the government could bring the money that had flowed out of the economy (when people sold off stocks and bonds and emptied out their bank accounts( back into the economy. Second, by spending even at a deficit, the government could increase demand, investment and profits, "pump-priming" the economic recovery. As long as the government acted in a counter-cyclical fashion – borrowing and spending more in recessions, and increasing taxes and spending less when economies threatened to over-heat – they could stave off economic downturns. Essentially, Keynes was arguing that governments could and should manage their economies and create economic stability and prosperity, by acting in a counter-cyclical fashion.

Keynesian economics was probably the most influential economic theory for the broader left-of-center, both in the U.S and in Europe, other than Marxism, of the 20th century. For New Dealers and members of the British Labor Party, and even for more moderate or conservative people like Henry Luce of Time Magazine, Keynesian economic policies seemed to offer a solution to all of the problems of capitalism, the constant booms and busts, and in exchange provide perpetual prosperity. Moreover, Keynesianism offered this solution as a resounding affirmation of public action – not only was perpetual prosperity possible, but it would be governments, not the private sector, that would provide it. Keynesianism quickly became one of the cornerstones of liberal and progressive public policy.

How does this all tie in with public employment? Well, to begin with, public employment advocates shared many of the beliefs that Keynes held – that the problem of the Great Depression was that there was insufficient demand for goods (what public employment advocates and other New Dealers called insufficient purchasing power), that governments could act directly to reverse this, and that the way to end the Depression was to spend a lot of money to increase demand. As Harry Hopkins and the people who worked for him in the WPA argued, public employment was a proven way to spend a lot of money very fast, that the money flowed straight into the pockets of working class people who had lost their purchasing power (and therefore, their ability to translate their potential demand for goods into effective demand) when they lost their jobs. Hopkins and the administrators of the WPA and similar programs became enthusiastic advocates for Keynesian economic theory and Keynesian economic policy, using the ideas of Keynes as justification for increasing federal spending and the budgets of the WPA and similar programs.

Now, one of the most important divisions in WWII-era liberalism became a key issue. Liberals who favored Keynesian theories nonetheless disagreed over how to implement them into public policy and split into two camps: fiscal Keynesians and social Keynesians.

Fiscal Keynesians focused on Keynes’ arguments about the importance of interest rates (and spending) on economic recovery, and argued that you could implement Keynesian policies through the "fisc and the fed" – the Federal Reserve and the normal spending of the government (with a strong preference for using interest rates before spending). Essentially, the government could indirectly manage the economy by lowering and raising interest rates appropriately, thus stimulating investment (and ultimately jobs and economic growth). If necessary, the government could increase economic spending, but that should be a last resort and in any case done through more traditional channels such as tax cuts or contracts. This would allow for economic management with a minimum of interference with the free market – the government wouldn’t have to grow or spend money for "socialist" programs.

Social Keynesians emphasized much more strongly the importance of spending and a larger government presence in the economy, including regulation of corporate behavior. In their view, the kind of spending was important in and of itself – government had to spend money in ways (preferably through government programs) that directed the money to working class people who lacked purchasing power, as this would have the broadest impact on demand; moreover, the private sector on its own would never provide the kind of full employment needed, so the government would have to intervene on its own (by providing public employment and constructing public works, by supporting unions and by establishing min. wages and max. hours laws); finally, social Keynesians argued that the government shouldn’t just spend more money in the same way that the private sector did – government spending should flow to areas and people that the private sector neglected, providing things like housing for the poor, health care, and social security benefits.

Naturally, public employment advocates were fiercely committed to social Keynesianism, since it was the theory closer to their own beliefs – although public employment advocates did argue that, beyond issues of increasing economic demand by spending, public employment further showed that the government could modulate key economic variables like the unemployment rate directly. This all came to a head in 1945-1946, when the Full Employment Act was introduced into Congress.

The original draft of the Full Employment Act was a strongly social-Keynesian piece of legislation. The bill proposed to formally commit the United States government to achieving full employment as a matter of standard economic policy, and to establish for all Americans the "right to a job." (At the time, most government officials and Keynesian economists believed to be somewhere between 1-2.7% unemployment, since there would always be some people who were in-between jobs, not working because they were in school or caring for a relative, etc.) Further, the bill required the President to submit a "Full Employment Budget" to Congress each year, in addition to the normal federal budget – this budget would provide an estimate for the employment rate for the next fiscal year given current trends, and if that rate was lower than full employment, to recommend the necessary policies and spending levels to reach full employment.

However, the bill was considerably watered down as it passed through Congress, in response to the concerns of conservatives and moderates who disliked the idea of government economic planning or creating the "right to a job" and the concerns of fiscal-Keynesian liberals who believed that such measures were unnecessary. The final Employment Act that was passed by the Congress and signed into law by President Truman was a much more fiscal Keynesian bill. In this version, the government declared that it would seek to "promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" without committing itself to achieving them, and the right to a job was stricken from the text. The Full Employment Budget was reduced to an annual economic forecast and a list of suggestions that neither the President nor the Congress was obligated to pay attention to much less enact into law. In no small part because of this defeat, social Keynesianism became rapidly eclipsed by fiscal Keynesianism, which solidified its status as the dominant theory of post-war liberals, especially in the Kennedy and Johnson years (for more on the importance of this, see Judith Russell’s book, Economics, Bureaucracy, and Race on the influence of fiscal Keynesians on the Great Society and the War on Poverty). The WPA, which had outlasted many New Deal programs and remained in operation through 1942, was not revived after the war.

-----------------

So, what are the implications for progressives today?

First, ideas matter. Public policies are immensely strengthened when they have theories that explain why and how they work, and why they are a good idea; they are likewise weakened when those theories are eclipsed by theories which explain why they are inefficient, unnecessary, or counter-productive.

Second, compromise has consequences. The decision to opt for fiscal Keynesianism over social Keynesianism had a major historical impact, both for liberal politics and policy and for the country at large. Social Keynesiansm was effectively halted for (by this point) sixty-one years. And this meant that in the 1960’s, the people who designed the Great Society and the War on Poverty excluded large-scale public employment in favor of education, social services, and job training – which limited the impact on poverty and unemployment, especially among the young and working-age people. It also meant that when fiscal Keynesianism stopped working in the 1970s and came under assault from Milton Friedman and other neo-classical economists, that liberals had no alternative policy to guide them. Notably in the 1960’s, one of the chief demands of the civil rights movement was for full-employment through public employment – the "Freedom Budget" promoted by A. Phillip Randolph and Martin Luther King Jr. was a major part of the civil rights movement’s platform, and the famous March on Washington was titled the "Jobs and Freedom March," as photographs of signs carried by participants attest to.

Third, when options are closed, so are imaginations. When fiscal Keynesianism became dominant, both experts, public officials, and voters alike were convinced that the most that government could do was to tinker around the edges of the American economy. Today, we’ve restricted ourselves even further, such that in 2004, when Democratic presidential candidates spoke of the need to "grow jobs...build jobs...make jobs," all they could think of to do so was to create tax credits and funds to lend money to businesses. Hopefully, by using history to remind ourselves that the options open today are not the only options available, we can begin to reverse this.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

EDIT: Damn, can't believe I forgot to add this point. In a previous diary I had mentioned that John Maynard Keynes was one of those who had missed the difference between public employment and public works, and I had intended to explain myself here.

In many writings and speeches before and after writing the General Theory, Keynes had argued that one of the key ways that Keynesian policies could be implemented was to use public works to lower unemployment. One of the objections to this policy, and indeed one of the experiences of later implementing these policies, was that public works failed to produce enough employment. This was used by conservatives, especially during the 1980s, that using the government instead of the free market was a bad idea.

The historical irony here is that the public works programs were being blamed for something that wasn't their fault - public works directs most of its money towards the works themselves, purchasing materials and land, purchasing machinery and equipment, and what employment it does generate tends to go to people who have experience in construction, which tends to be people who are already employed. By providing extra jobs to construction and general contracting firms, public works does increase employment around the margins, when these firms hire on extra workers to meet the increased need, but it's really not large enough an effect to provide the reductions in unemployment that Keynes was looking for.

So, the point I'm trying to make here is that progressives need to be very careful about what policies we support and why - clarity of theory and practice is really important. Supporting a program because it's intrinsically worthy is all well and good, but we have to be sure that they will have the effects desired, otherwise our opponents will use the results as a weapon to attack the basic idea of government action.

[+/-] Read More...

Misappropriated History and Tea-Bagging

One of the peculiarities of recent conservative efforts to mobilize public opinion against the Obama administration's stimulus and budget plans has been their uncritical adoption of the mantle of the American Revolution on behalf of the conservative cause.

Witness Nebraskans chanting "no taxation without representation," Or the risible "tea-bagging" parties being held by a bunch of astro-turf conservative organizations promoted by Fox News.

On one level, this shouldn't be surprising. Conservatives like to think of themselves as the true heirs of the American Revolution (see "original intent"), in order to claim the mantle of legitimacy and authenticity, and the anti-tax theme at least makes the fit better than other historical analogies. In addition to supporting their current political aims, this theme also does the yoeman work of insinuating that the U.S has always been a conservative, anti-tax nation, and that freedom equates with not being taxed. Winning the historical imagination, like winning the rhetorical battle for other powerful symbols such as the flag, mothers, "freedom," has a powerful impact on people's political thinking.

But as a historian, I would caution the modern conservative movement that historical analogies can be dangerously double-edged. The American Revolution was a tumulteous, and quite radical time period, and a lot of the ideas advanced by the Revolutionary Generation (a term I personally prefer to the Founding Fathers) go far beyond the anti-tax, small-government, negative liberties, property rights ideology of modern conservatives.

Consider, for example, Tom Paine. For a long time, I've considered Tom Paine to be my favorite member of the Revolutionary Generation - he wasn't rich (a struggling corsetmaker/tax-collector/pamphleteer), he wasn't a slaveowner (Paine was a fervent abolitionist), and he wasn't yet another bucolic farmer (Paine lived in London, Philadelphia and Paris).

Add to that his internationalism, his commitment to universal suffrage, and his quite radical economic policies - although a fan of Adam Smith, Paine advocated the distribution of public lands, progressive taxation, and an early version of social insurance. Eric Foner's book, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, is a brilliant overview of how Paine emerged from the world of Philadelphia's self-educated artisans, his participation in drafting the radical Pennsylvania Constitution, and his engagement with the question of controlling the price of food versus laissez faire in the commodtiies market.

Over on DailyKos, Sam Wise Gingy's excellent diary reminds us of how radical Tom Paine could be with this quote:

Separate an individual from society, and give him an island or a continent to possess, and he cannot acquire personal property. He cannot be rich. So inseparably are the means connected with the end, in all cases, that where the former do not exist the latter cannot be obtained. All accumulation, therefore, of personal property, beyond what a man's own hands produce, is derived to him by living in society; and he owes on every principle of justice, of gratitude, and of civilization, a part of that accumulation back again to society from whence the whole came.

This is putting the matter on a general principle, and perhaps it is best to do so; for if we examine the case minutely it will be found that the accumulation of personal property is, in many instances, the effect of paying too little for the labor that produced it; the consequence of which is that the working hand perishes in old age, and the employer abounds in affluence.

It is, perhaps, impossible to proportion exactly the price of labor to the profits it produces; and it will also be said, as an apology for the injustice, that were a workman to receive an increase of wages daily he would not save it against old age, nor be much better for it in the interim. Make, then, society the treasurer to guard it for him in a common fund; for it is no reason that, because he might not make a good use of it for himself, another should take it.

Here you see a lot of the elements of radical republicanism in the 18th century - the deep understanding of the social nature of economic activity, and the attendant social nature of property; a strong belief in the labor theory of value from an artisan's perspective, and a budding awareness that capitalism might cheat workers of the fair value of their work; and the almost unspoken idea that the commonwealth and the common good should be the foundation of society and economy. I doubt that modern conservatives would want to claim this American Revolutionary as their figurehead.

But even if you focus on more conservative Founding Fathers, you keep coming across comments so radical that they explode the staid veneer of patriotic memory. Even the arch-moderate John Adams argued that ""All the perplexities, confusion and distresses in America arise not from defects in the Constitution or confederation, nor from want of honor or virtue, as much from downright ignorance of the nature of coin, credit, and circulation.," and called for speculators in grain to be shot. If you look at Thomas Jefferson's writings on corporations and banks, you begin to get a sense why the northern urban worker joined the Democratic Party - ""If the American people ever allow private banks to control the issue of their currency first by inflation and then by deflation, the banks and corporations that will grow up around them will deprive the people of all property until their children will wake up homeless on the continent their fathers conquered. "

One of my favorite works on the American Revolution, Gordon Wood's Radicalism of the American Revolution, should remind us that the idea that the American Revolution was exception in that it was conservative, is a nonsense. The American Revolution turned society upside down, dispossessed much of the colonial elite, saw huge transfers of political and economic power, and set down new and newly combined languages, traditions of thought, and structures of government and politics. Inside the first twenty years of the new government, there were no less than two separate rebellions "from below," the emergence of the first American trade unions, and the first stirrings of abolitionism.

Remember that the next time you see some right-winger wave a tea-bag in your face.

[+/-] Read More...

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

Re-Post Number 4: "WPA or PWA - Which Policy for Progressives?" (Aug 11, 2007)

Note: the following re-post moves from the mechanics of public employment policy to some of the intellectual issues that complicate the question of direct job creation. Here, the issue is whether there is an important difference between "public employment" and "public works;" my argument is that there is an important difference, and that progressives should emphasize the former over the latter as an anti-cyclical economic recovery policy.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The difference between public employment and public works is not an easy one to grasp, and many very smart people (John Maynard Keynes for one, L̩on Blum for another) have often missed the difference and advocated for one when they should have been advocating for the other. Many historians of the New Deal have been equally confused Рto give a good example, Udo Sauter was particularly split on the issue: "It seems possible to differentiate between public works for relief purposes and work relief, he wrote, since "according to one definition, the former term would designate "needed public improvements," which may have been advanced [in time] to provide employment, but which must have been undertaken in the near future regardless...work relief, by contrast, would consist of "operations definitively undertaken to provide employment." However, Sauter then argued that this distinction was essentially artificial, since both programs involved building and both were intended to provide for employment. At first glance, this pronouncement seems reasonable: both policies involved the hiring of workers and the production of certain goods, both directed their workers to manufacture similar goods (buildings, roads, bridges and tunnels, and so forth); indeed, both policies drew their funding from the same bills and were carried out by agencies with similar initials.

However, I would argue that public employment and public works have to be seen as contrasting policies that, during the era of the New Deal struggled over funding, political support, and popular prominence, and that should be seen as distinct. Beyond the immediate level of competing bureaucracies, public employment and public works had important policy differences in regards to focus, effect, results, and method of administration.

To begin with, public employment’s focus was on employing people, while public works’ focus was on the end product of their labor; this difference would inform decisions made by administrators seeking to suit limited budgets to their programs focus – would they spend their last $100 for the month on three workers’ salaries or 75 bags of cement? These kinds of decisions would greatly affect how much each program would affect the economy and in what ways. Moreover, focus also became an important influence on how these programs perceived the Great Depression. Administrators of public employment programs tended to see the crisis through the lens of mass unemployment, and concluded that the road to recovery would be to bring unemployment down to "normal" levels. Public works administrators tended to emphasize the shocking decline in production and investment and argued that the best way out of the Depression was to use government dollars to re-invigorate America’s "core industries" – construction, steel, concrete and brick-making, lumber, and tool and machinery production being just a few of these.

This contrast carried over to the programs’ intended effects. Public employment officials believed their programs would impact the economy through its effects on people – first, by preventing outright starvation among the unemployed; second, by reducing the impact of mass unemployment on wages; and third and most importantly, by directing purchasing power into the hands of a population that had been unable to be consumers for some time, expanding demand while redistributing income and goods towards the lowest economic bracket. By contrast, public works officials believed that their programs would aid recovery by addressing the needs of industry. Public works orders would provide a baseline of demand to keep factories open, but even more so, the public works themselves would speed up the process of economic development – dams would bring new energy sources (both water and electricity) into rural areas, kick-starting the modernization of agriculture, and opening up new markets through the extension of modern transportation systems into remote areas.

The two programs’ results were also different. While both emphasized construction, public employment officials favored light construction, which favored large workforces and could be done without the need for heavy machinery or large amounts of materials. Light construction thus tended to produce goods suited to the needs of the urban public – schools, hospitals, libraries, city halls, airports, post offices, city streets, and housing. Public works programs tended to produce goods more suited to improving the nation’s economic infrastructure – electrical power generation, irrigation, national highways, large-scale bridges and tunnels, and so forth. These "public goods" not only had a close connection to the goals and intended effects of the program, but also had an impact on the two programs’ constituency – public employment tended to draw the support of the unemployed and the low-wage working class, while public works tended to draw the support of construction firms, contractors, and skilled workers, especially in the building trades.

Finally, public employment and public works used very different mechanisms to produce their "public goods." To create their light construction projects, public employment officials overwhelmingly used what is known as force account – the direct hiring of workers by the government, in this case with the Federal government as the employer of record. This technique gave public employment officials much more control over how many new jobs were created (and just as important who got them) in which areas, the wages and working conditions of those jobs (which often had serious impacts on local labor markets), but it also meant that the Federal government had to deal with the problems of managing workers with widely varying levels of skills, literacy, and experience. Public works administrators, on the other hand, in no small part because heavier construction required more investment in machinery, tended to build their projects by contracting out to private construction firms. This simplified the process of hiring workers, assured a level of skill and oversight over the construction process, and provided much needed business to a vital American industry. However, it also had its problems – contracts tended to provide work to the already employed, diminishing the potential impact on unemployment. Furthermore, the government had much less say over hiring, the conditions of employment, given the intervening layers of contractors and subcontractors.


As has been suggested, these technical differences tended to have ideological or intellectual consequences, as programs naturally gravitated towards political economies that validated their purpose. Public employment was more suited to, and open to, political economies that emphasized demand-side solutions to the Depression, redistribution of income, and more direct government involvement in the economy. Public works was likewise more attracted to political economies that emphasized growth, economic development, planning, and government stimulation of the private sector.

-------------------

So what does all of this historical theorizing mean for progressives today?

First, progressives should understand what different policy options should or are suited to do, and approach them as parts of a toolbox, and not one-or-the-other solutions. Public works, like building or repairing or maintaining the massive bridges across the Mississippi that we have seen are in urgent need of renewal, are not the best means of fighting unemployment, economic stagnation among the working class, or poverty. Similarly, public employment functions best when the majority of its funds can go towards payroll instead of towards the expensive machinery, materials, and land that are required for the heavier kinds of construction. However, there shortcomings – or as I would argue, specializations – are just the flip-side of advantages.

The strengths of public works are producing large-scale public goods that work to improve our national infrastructure (bridges, tunnels, and highways), provide important services like electricity, or defend us against natural disasters. The strengths of public employment are reducing unemployment, increasing purchasing power, and creating more real-estate-and services-type public goods – things like housing, schools, libraries, post offices, hospitals, and roads.

The two approaches complement each other, as public works creates the larger institutional frameworks that spur economic growth and economic opportunity and public employment provides the support to workers and consumers to turn that institutional opportunity into prosperity for all.

Second, progressives should think of policies not just as good in and of themselves, but as over-arching and inter-connected processes that shape the society and economy we live in. For the last thirty-odd years, Americans have been taught to be pessimistic about the ability of the government to effect change in our lives – you can see this in editorials that say that presidential policy has little impact on the economy, or pundits who assume that market-based approaches are the only efficient option possible. However, the truth is that the government can and does make a huge difference in our economic and social lives.

The next step towards building an effective progressive agenda is learning to visualize the economy and society we want to have, and seeing different policies as ways to achieve parts of that. Used correctly, public employment can give us a high employment, high wage economy; used correctly, public works can give us faster and cleaner transportation, cleaner and cheaper electricity, and a safe reliable infrastructure.




[+/-] Read More...

This Just In: Our Political Opponents Are Insane



















Perhaps it's just April Fools, but the Republicans have finally unveiled their budgetish-type document (now with numbers!), and it's so cartoonishly insane that liberal satire newspapers would reject the submission as too ludicrous to be plausible. What's in it?

  1. Freeze All Non-Military Discretionary Spending for Five Years - thus, in the middle of a recession which has seen dramatic declines in purchasing power, the GOP proposes to throw the breaks on for 22% of the entire economy. This is Hooverism gone mad, Treasury thinking at a bone-deep level. Besides the basic economic insanity, it's political suicide. Let's see: Department of Transportation (let's see, you've now pissed off contractors, materials manufacturers, and every Congressman in the country who wants re-election, Department of Education (now you've pissed off parents, teachers, children's advocaes, "reformers,"), Department of Health and Human Services (now you've pissed off hospitals, doctors, nurses, and sick people), Department of Agriculture (now you've pissed off farmers and agro-business), and the list keeps going. Given that not even Reagan at the height of his influence was able to even slow spending increases, this is like proposing to replace the U.S dollar with candyfloss.
  2. Ending All Stimulus - "the budget captures savings by repealing “stimulus” funding beyond the current year, excluding unemployment insurance; and these savings go toward reducing the deficit." So not only are we going to be halting any further efforts to stimulate the economy, but we're going to reverse the stimulus package Congress just passed.
  3. Privatize Medicare - everyone 54 or younger? Guess what, you don't get Medicare anymore. Instead, you get yourself a "premium support payment," i.e a nice voucher that's also means-tested and capped at current levels. That should help a lot when the cost of health care increases at 7% and you're trying to buy individual health care plans instead of being covered under a group plan that spreads costs across all Americans 65+.
  4. Block-Grant Medicaid - you know how huge numbers of people are losing their jobs and their health insurance, and how the Medicaid rolls are swelling as people try to get some sort of coverage? Guess what? The Republicans have decided to replace Medicaid's per-patient grant-in-aid with "an allotment tailored for each State’s low-income population, indexed for inflation and population growth." So if a recession hits, and all of the sudden the number of people in poverty dramatically increases faster than inflation and population? Tough luck, apparently Republicans believe in "individual Americans." Don't you feel better?
  5. Huge Tax Cuts for the Rich, Corporations -Let's see now - all of the Bush tax cuts kept, naturally, a 28.% cut in the highest income tax bracket, a 28.5% cut in the corporate income tax bracket, elimination of the estate tax, and eliminating capital gains taxes for two years. All of this, by the way, won't apparently cut revenue at all, because tax revenues will magically increase by a trillion dollars a year by 2014!
So to sum up: Republicans want to freeze all spending and privatize your Medicare so that they can give CEOs, corporations, and other millionaires a whopping great tax cut.

I'm actually wondering if this is some kind of cry for help. Given that this goes even further than the already lunatic proposals that McCain put forward that were decisively repudiated in 2008, you really have to wonder whether a part of the Republican subconscious is attempting to go out in a burst of wingnut glory, a sort of death-by-electorate.

[+/-] Read More...

Ideology Matters - What's In a Name?

One of the absolute truisms of political opinion polling for a long, long time has been that American political ideology has been relatively static for a long, long time. The graph to the left is based on the Harris poll of ideological self-identification that's been conducted over the last forty years, and the data's been almost constant - about 35% of the country identifies as conservative, about 40% identifies as moderate, and about 18% of the country identifies as liberal.

Now, I've long held the belief that this artificial stasis in ideology, given the dramatic upheavals in political fortunes from the Watergate revolt and the election of Jimmy Carter in 1974-1976 to the dominance of Reaganism from 1980-1992 and the rise of Clintonian Third Way-ism from 1992-2000 and the epic crash and burn of Bushian conservatism from 2000-2008, is the result of using the stale terminology of liberal, conservative, and moderate as the only ideological terms of note.

Now look at the second poll there, done by the Center for American Progress. If you give people more options, lo and behold, the pciture gets a lot less static. The number of liberals doesn't change much, but all of the sudden there's a whole 16% of the population who's calling themselves progressives, and there's even some libertarians and people who don't know what the heck they are. If you push the squishy moderates to pick sides, it turns out that about 47% percent of the country considers themselves Progressives or Liberals, 48% call themselves Conservative or Libertarian, and another 5% remain...well, very confused people

The closeness of all this actually makes a lot of sense, considering the tight elections we had in 2000 and 2004, and the differential mobilization in 2002 (when the Right really mobilized pro-war sentiment) and 2006 (when the Left really mobilized anti-war and and anti-party-in-power sentiment). I imagine the 2008 election might have shifted the boundaries somewhat, as Americans experienced both a conservtive campaign that was unusually open about what it was (no hiding those Palin rallies) and a liberal campaign that was actually willing to talk about why it thought the liberal philosophy of government was better than the conservative philosophy of government. Whether that will last, I imagine we'll find out in 2010 and 2012.

This doesn't actually surprise me, and it in fact it absolutely makes sense to me that - given the concerted demonization of liberalism by conservatives from the Great Society onwards - a good number of people were actually left-of-center but wouldn't call themselves liberals. But it does raise a good question - what does it mean to be a liberal, and what does it mean to be a progressive.

This is something that I've discussed and debated a lot with my friends and colleagues over the past couple of years. Daraka Larimore-Hall, whose political thinking I deeply respect, basically argues that, A. there is theoretically a difference between the two, and B. the differences have been blurred by people who are really liberals but won't call themselves liberals, and by people who are actually New Democrats who don't want to admit they're conservatives, and other weird political chameleons. (See also here). I think he's broadly right, although I wish he weren't.

I'd like to make the case that these two things actually do (or at least should) mean different things. If the two have been blurred, I believe that political space should be made for liberalism to stand on its own two feet, and for progressives to have their own turf. To say nothing of social democrats, democratic socialists, socialists, and other ideological formations further to the Left.

So, to explain what the difference between Liberalism and Progressiveism, I'm re-posting something I wrote in response to Matthew Yglesias' post here, which argued that:
But while the historically Progressives did stand for some good things, and are a part of the backstory of contemporary American liberalism, they also stood for some very bad things. Certainly, whatever sins liberalism may have committed in the 1970s as it fell into disrepute were distinctly minor compared to the problems with the Progressives. "Liberal," by contrast, is an important term with a noble history and a contested legacy.

My response was this:

"While the question of "progressive" vs. "liberal" is not the most pressing of debates, in is an important one. How we identify ourselves goes further than issues of terminology; it speaks to who we are as activists and who we think we are, it asks major questions about what it is we seek to achieve and what it means to be on the left in modern America. Moreover, it begs the question as to what use activists should make of history in guiding our thought and action.

On one level, Matt raises a good point. In current political discourse, "progressive" can be a vague term than can be applied equally to the left-most Green Party activist or to the right-most New Democrat. Indeed, the term’s prominence in recent years owes as much to the efforts of New Democrats to elide the differences between themselves and traditional liberals as it does the efforts of liberals to reclaim a right to exist in the political mainstream. It is not by accident that the major New Democrat think-tank chose the name "Progressive" Policy Institute, or that Hillary Clinton described herself as a "progressive" in Democratic debates to muddy the ideological waters between herself, Barack Obama, and John Edwards, as if to say "we’re all progressives now, so let’s not compare agendas."

Historically, it is also true that in the Progressive Era, self-identified progressives supported some vile endeavors: they could be quite elitist, disdaining "ignorant" voters and preferring government-by-experts. Many were ethnocentric or outright racist, thinking of immigrants and blacks as lesser races in need of guidance from the Civilized West. Certainly, Woodrow Wilson thought so when he segregated the federal government and Theodore Roosevelt largely agreed when it came to the invasion of the Philippines or military interventions into Latin America. The Progressive Era was also the era when Jim Crow was established in law through the active disenfranchisement of blacks and poor whites, and the era of race riots. Certainly it is true that a conservative like Jonah Goldberg could take this history, sift out all contrary facts, and present progressivism as the authoritarian forebear of modern liberalism.

However, I would argue that liberalism would not fare much better under the same selective scrutiny. Liberals like FDR accepted and subsidized segregation in the South (and in the North) as the devil’s bargain for southern votes for the New Deal. As Ira Katznelson notes in his book When Affirmative Action Was White, the New Deal’s exclusion of blacks (and women) from Social Security, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, and the Wagner Act, while simultaneously boosting the economic position of whites through New Deal programs and the GI Bill, had a huge impact on racial inequality in America. It is also true that liberals like FDR carried out the policy of Japanese internment during WWII, and that Truman was responsible for dropping the first (and only) atomic bombs, giving official license to Cold War red-baiting, instituting loyalty oaths and purges, and creating the national-security and military-industrial complexes we live with today. The same liberals who gave us the Great Society, the War on Poverty, and the Civil Rights Act also gave us the war in Vietnam. The ultimate point here is not that liberalism is historically illegitimate; but that the study of history admits few pure heroes or pure villains and that a study of conservatism would lead to far more skeletons in the closet than Mr. Goldberg would care to remember.

So what now? Are we to decide who we are and what we stand for by a game of historical hot potato? Absolutely not. More serious issues are at stake, and the difference between "progressivism" and "liberalism" have deeper significances and broader importance than the brand value of a label.

As historians of the Progressive Era like Mary Furner, Daniel Rodgers, Robert Johnson, Eldon Eisenach, John Recchiuti, Martin Sklar, and others have explored, there was something special to the progressives. They were the first generation of Americans to live in an age of corporate capitalism, and they were perhaps the last generation of Americans whose minds were not limited by the acceptance of the resulting social order as natural. Progressives like Theodore Roosevelt or Robert LaFollette proposed far-sighted policies such as universal health insurance, the right to vote for women, the right to an eight hour day, the minimum wage, old age insurance, unemployment insurance, and disability insurance, the right to join a union, industrial health and safety regulations, and the abolition of child labor. In many ways, they defined the agenda that liberalism would pursue.

However, the scope of progressive imaginations was larger than just this. Progressives looked beyond the world they lived in to advocate for a new economic order, something different from either capitalism or communism. In bold, confident terms, Progressivism argued that an activist government should exercise economic sovereignty and engage in economic planning, and regulate, nationalize, or abolish the great industrial corporations of the day. Their vision was a way of life in which cooperation replaced competition as the guiding impulse of economic life, in which human values would be privileged above market values, and in which sweeping inequality would be replaced by a rough equality of wealth, a fair share in national prosperity, something they called "an American standard of living." Their rationale for this vision was not grounded in traditional liberal concerns about the individual or in Marxist ideology that the worker should own the means of production.

Rather, Progressives were animated by a faith in collective action, and a belief that the flaws in society created by humans could be fixed by humans. In a very real sense, the Progressives were the heirs of a rich tradition of American republicanism, a philosophy that saw the sovereign people as the only legitimate source of political and economic power, that believed in the defense of the common-wealth against private privilege, and that demanded the great concentrations of wealth be redistributed to create a "rough equality" among equal citizens, lest inequalities of wealth become inequalities of political power. Ultimately, the vision put forward was that economic sovereignty - the right to decide how each one of us lives our lives in the workplace, in the marketplace, and in the public square - must be taken from the hands of monopolistic corporations and restored to popular government. As Theodore Roosevelt put it:

"The Constitution guarantees protections to property, and we must make that promise good. But it does not give the right of suffrage to any corporation. The true friend of property, the true conservative, is he who insists that property shall be the servant and not the master of the commonwealth; who insists that the creature of man's making shall be the servant and not the master of the man who made it. The citizens of the United States must effectively control the mighty commercial forces which they have themselves called into being."

Alan Brinkley and other historians have noted that the political vision of post-war liberalism shied from such challenges to capitalism. After a vigorous and diverse flowering of progressive experimentation in the New Deal – all the way from the economic planning enshrined by the National Recovery Administration and the Tennessee Valley Authority to the provision of public jobs in the WPA and the vision of a right to a job, and the price-setting powers of the OPA – post-war liberals were tired of struggle. Abandoning even the modest progressivism of social Keynesianism, liberals looked to accommodate capitalism and capitalists, to use social programs to compensate (not prevent or replace) the shortcomings of the economy, of using interest rates and military spending to manage the economy, rather than expansive investments in housing and infrastructure. Above all, liberals sought safer waters than the issue of reconstructing capitalism. Ironically, liberals looked to civil rights, environmentalism, education, and other "quality of life" issues as safer targets for reform.

In the long run, it is to our great advantage that liberals took the cause of reform in new directions. On another level, it is important that we recognize that a price was paid: a narrow horizon of imagination, a smaller vision of what could be accomplished, and a certain complacency with the status quo. And when the foundations that underwrote that complacency – close to full employment, steady economic growth, a strong union movement, and favorable trade conditions – cracked apart in the 1970s, even liberalism became too radical for American politics.

And here we are today, in what I believe is the beginning of the post-post liberal era. Eight years of the Bush Administration have catastrophically delegitimized and exhausted modern conservativism, conservatives no longer have anything new to offer to each other or anyone else in terms of ideas, and the American electorate is increasingly comfortable and desirous of a more active government presence in their lives. Part of that desire comes from the fact that we are living in a precarious time: deregulation and free trade agreements have diminished the power of government to modulate the shocks of the global market, yet the promised results of a more risk-intensive world order have yet to arrive. Our economic system is badly imbalanced between our means and our salaries, between productivity and income, and between wages and profits. The world economic system seems no better, and instability and uncertainty are the order of the day.

Two things become clear. First, there is a space that will open in American politics for new agendas, new approaches, and new thinking. Second, the consequences of which ideas we will choose are very high. Will we take up the banner of liberalism, and strive valiantly to repair the damage that has been done, and to try once more to make the system we have more livable for the American people, all the while accepting the fact that we live in an age of international finance and globalized production that constrains our options? Or will we instead take up the banner of progressivism, and attempt to construct a new way of life, a political economy that is better suited to the current time and the human condition, knowing as we do that the one we have now is dangerously blind to human need?

For my own part, I would call myself a progressive, and call upon others to take up the label, and the cause. As a historian, I have never felt the kind of doubt that liberals post-1968 have felt – the creeping fear, after McGovern, Mondale, and Dukakis, that maybe we’re wrong, that maybe Americans really hate us and what we stand for. For as Theodore Roosevelt once said, "we stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord."



[+/-] Read More...